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ABSTRACT
"Unnecessary variation" isdefined as variation
not attributable to variation in fundamentals
In the absence of agood model of macroeconomic fundamentals, the question "areexchange rates excessively
variable?," cannot be answered bycomparing the variance of the
actual exchange rate to the variance of a set of fundamentals.
This paper notes thefailure of regression equations to explain exchangerate movements evenusing contemporaneous macroeconomic variablesIt notes as well the
statistical rejections of the unbiasedness of the forwardexchange rate as a predictor of
the spot rate.It then argues that, giventhese results, there isnot much to be learned fromthe variance-bounds tests and bubblestests.
The paper also discussesrecent results on variation in
the exchange risk premiums arising from variationin conditionalvariances, both as a source of the bias in the forward
rate tests and as a source of
variation in the spot rate. It finishes with a discussionof whether speculators'
expectations are stabilizing or destabilizing,
as measured by survey data.The paper concludes that it is possible that
exchange rates have beenexcessively variable --as, for example, when thereare speculative bubbles -- butthat if policy-makers try systematically to exploit
their credibility in orderto stabilize exchange rates, they may see their
current credibility vanish.
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The proponents of floating
exchange rates before 1973 didnot
promise that exchange rates would
necessarily be stable under such a
system, but only that they would beas stable as the underlyingmacro-
economic fundamentais.lNevertheless, the widespreadfeeling is that
exchange rates have turned outto be more volatile than
necessary. Many
practitioners believe thatexchange rates are driven by
Psychological
factors and other irrelevant
market dynamics, rather thanby ecomomic
fundamentals. Support seemsto have grown in the l980sfor "target—
zone" proposals, or some othersort of government action tostabilize
exchange rates
Economists have understood forsome time that under conditionsof
high international capital
mobility, currency values willmove sharply
and unexpectedly inresponse to new information. Even
so, actual move-
ments of exchange rates have beenpuzzling in two major respects.
First, the proportion ofexchange rate changes that weare able to pre-
dict seems to be not justlow, but zero. According torational expecta-
tions theory we should be ableto use our models to predictthat propor-
tion of exchange ratechanges that is correctly predicted
by exchange
market participants. Yetneither models based oneconomic fundamentals,
nor simple time series models,nor the forecasts of marketparticipants
as reflected in the forward discount
or in survey data, seem ableto
predict better than the lagged
spot rate. Second, the proportionof
exchange rate movements that can beexplained even after the fact,using
contemporaneous macroeconomic
variables, is disturbingly low.
—1——2—
1. Introduction
When we return to the basics, to ask what is actually known about
the crucial building blocks of exchange markets, we find one question
that has been answered and three that have not. The one conclusion
about which there is no longer serious disagreement is that monetary
disturbances have real effects. The 1980s have witnessed very large
swings in real money supplies, real interest rates, and——more
demonstrably——real exchange rates, convincing most observers that there
is not an exogenous instantly—equilibrating optimally—functioning real
economy that can be divorced from monetary factors.Itfollows that
even if financial markets do operate efficiently——a proposition that we
neither automatically presuppose nor rule out in this paper——one cannot
make an argument against government intervention in foreign exchange
markets on the grounds of Arrow—Debreu optimality alone.
There are three questions that have yet to be satisfactorily
answered, and that are examined in this study. Question 1: How
responsive are investors' demands for domestic and foreign assets to
expected rates of return, that is, what is the degree of substitu-
tability? Question 2: How do investors form expectations? In
particular, how much weight do they give to the contemporaneous spot
rate and how much to other factors? Question 3: How does the actual
process governing the spot exchange rate correspond tothe process
embodied in investors' expectations, that is, are expectations
rational? As we will see, these questions together contain the
essential elements necessary to evaluate claims of excessive exchange
rate variability.—3—
We will be trying to shedlight on these questions bydrawing on
several areas of the existingempirical literature on thespot and
forward exchange markets, as wellas on some new empirical results.
Empirical topics to be covered, ifonly briefly, are non—stationarity of
the nominal and real exchange
rates, regression tests of exchange rate
determination, forward market efficiency,variance—bounds tests and
bubbles tests, portfolio_optjmizatjoand the exchange riskpremium, and
expectations survey data.
However, we begin by considering themore general motivation for
answering the three questions stated above: howknowing the answers to
them might help answer whetherexchange rate fluctuations have been
unnecessarily large.
2. Factors In lterainIng'RxcesslyeVariability'
In seeking to get a handle on thequestion of alleged excessive
variability, we specify as general a model ofthe spot exchange rate as
possible.
(1) s =S(Z,ii*, ASu).
We represent fundamental determinants
such as asset supplies by t, the
interest differential by i—i*, investors'expected future change in
the exchange rate by ASeand any short—term random factorsby u. The
last will be foundnecessary if we are to confront regression
results,
which under the best of circumstanceshave relatively low R2s. It will
also be found necessary if weare to consider the issue of alleged
short—term volatility unrelated to fundamentals.—4—
The equation is so general that it could be interpreted as the
old balance—of—payments flow approach to exchange rate determination,
where 9.represents factors affecting the current account and the other
three variables are determinants of the capital account •Weshall
follow the stock approach here however, in which the focus is on stocks
of assets rather than flows.
We can impose additional structure on equation (1) by defining
9.to be specifically the log of the supply of domestic assets minus the
log of the supply of foreign assets, defining s to be the log of the
spot price of foreign exchange, imposing homogeneity, and assuming also
that the two components of expected returns enter with coefficients of
equal magnitude:
(2) s =9.—L(i_i*_Me;u)
In equation (2), 9.is the relative supply of domestic assets and L
is the relative demand for domestic assets, which depends positively on
rpl*_ASe ,therisk premium or expected excess rate of return on
domestic assets. In a portfolio—balance approach, for example, we could
assume that the share of the portfolio allocated to foreign assets,
x, is linearly related to the risk premium on foreignassets:4
(3) x =A—B(rp)
Then (2) would hold, with
log(x(.)) —log(l—x(.)),and
dL/d(rp) =(!+1JB—5—
We can now use equation (2) to consider thequestion of exchange
rate variability. it seems likely thatregardless whether the funda—
nientals term 2.is defined to include onlymoney supplies or also
supplies of bonds and other assets, one cannot in factexplain observed
variability in s by variability in 9..This is the Implication of
both volatility tests and regressions of thespot rate against funda-
mentals such as asset supplies .5The same conclusion seems to holdas
well if the fundamentals term
9.isdefined to include the current
account6
We are thus led to consider the other twoterms in equation (2),
which are determinants of asset demands ratherthan asset supplies:
and u. The expectations formationprocess is key to the
question of variability, whether as a source of fluctuationsor as
"stabilizing speculation," moderating the effect ofdisturbances that
originate in the other terms •Toallow for both the bandwagon effects
that are so often cited by participants in theexchange market,7 and the
stabilizing expectations that are the norm in models basedon economic
fundamentals, we can specify expected depreciation to be thesum of an






ODnsider a disturbance in u, orany of the other terms, that
increases s. lb the extent thatg > 0, "speculators," or investors,
will expect future increases ins, will shift their asset demand into
foreign assets, and will thereby exaggerate the increase Ins. To—6—
the extent that 0 > 0, they will expect a return back to the equilib—
rium value andwill thereby dampen the fluctuation. If g > 0,
expectations are said to be elastic or destabilizing; if g < 0, they
are said to be inelastic or stabilizing.
It is important to note that equation (5) could be fully
consistent with rational expectations in a variety of models. For
example, in the case g =0,regressive expectations can be rational in
the sticky—price monetary ("overshooting") model of Dornbusch (1976),
where the rational value of 0 depends on the speed of adjustment of
the price level, or in the portfolio—balance model of Kouri (1977) and
Rodriguez (1980), where it depends on the speed of adjustment of the
stock of foreign claims.8 In the case 0 =0on the other hand,
extrapolative or "bandwagon" expectations could be rational in models of
speculative bubbles such as Blanchard and Watson (1982) or Dornbusch
(1982) .Finally,in the case g =00, static expectations
(ASe =0)could be rational if the true exchange rate process is a
random walk, a result consistent with recent empirical findings.9
An alternative interpretation of equation (5) is a speculative
bubble: speculators think that there is a probability0 that the
bubble will burst within the coining period and the spot rate will return
all the way to equilibrium s, and a probability (1—8) that it will
continue on a bubble path (in which case it will increase at a rate
equal to g/(1—e) times the rate at which it has already been
increasing) .oAgain,such a bubble could be rational, if the actual
spot rate turns out to follow the same process.—7--
Friedman (1953) argued persuasively thatspeculators who had a
destabilizing effect would be "buying high andselling low," and thus
would lose money and be driven out of the market.In modern terms, he
argued that destabilizing speculation would be inconsistentwith
rational expectations. &t the modern realizationthat one can have
rational stochastic speculative bubbles, in whicheach speculator stands
to lose money if he doesn't go along with theothers, has all but
destroyed the classic Friedman argument.






where is the degree of substitutability dL/d(rp) (as, forexample,
in equation (4)).
Volatility will be high, in the sense that the variability of
s will be high with 9.and i—it given, if the variability of u is
high, if g is high, and if O is low. Indeed ifwe were interested
in the one—period effect ofu alone, on the theory that this is the
source of short—term uncertainty, then the conditional variance of
would be given by
2
(7) l+(y)var(u)
Equation (7) illustrates in a simple way a conflict that exists in dis-
cussions of excessive exchange rate volatility. Someeconomists, such
as Tobin (1978), argue that exchange rates are too variable because
financial markets are "excessively efficient," that capital sl0shes back—8—
and forth among countries in response to trivial disturbances, and that
a tax on foreign exchange transactions would reduce volatility. This
view says that volatility is high because 3,the degree of substituta-
bility, is high. t there is another view, associated with McKinnon
(1976), that exchange rates are too variable because of a "deficiency of
stabilizing speculation,' in other words, because is too low. The
apparent paradox can be resolved by noting that the variance is posi-
tively related to (the Ibbin case) if8 < g, (and1 > (g—8))
because in that case the expectations to which investors react are
destabilizing. The variance is negatively related to (the McKinnon
case) if B > g, because in that case expectations are stabilizing. To
analyze the possible sources of exchange rate volatility, we need to
consider both the degree of substitutability and whether expectations
are stabilizing.
In this paper we will be seeking enlightenment on the empirical
magnitude of these parameters. In doing so we are leaving out much that
is central to the macroeconomics of exchange rates •Evenif the expres-
sion in (7) is small, one could still make many arguments for or against
restricting the movements of the exchange rate that result from changes
in macroeconomic factors such as2. or i—i' (assuming it could be
done)
For example, many economists believe that the strong real appre-
ciation of the dollar in the early l980s can be attributed to a shift in
the monetary—fiscal policy mix that raised the interest differential
j_j* and made U.S. assets more attractive to world investors. Some
believe further that it would not have been desirable to force down the—9—
value of the dollar, for example byforeign exchange intervention or the
imposition of controls to shut off the capitalinflow (even assuming it
possible), in the absence of reductions in the fiscalbudget deficit.
The argument is that U.S. Interestrates would have risen even more than
they in fact did, crowding Out domestic investment.''
To evaluate sucharguments, one should probably specify an objec-
tive function, including such variablesas output, inflation, trade
balance and investment, andtry to judge whether letting the market
determine the exchange rate is likely toresult in a higher value of the
objective function than proposed plans to stabilizethe exchange rate.
Such questions are beyond thescope of this paper.'2
Our interest here is only In thequestion whether foreign
exchange markets can fairly be said to beworking well. If allegations
are found justified that speculative bubbles,a failure of market eff I—
ciency, or random fluctuations, are raisingexchange rate variability
needlessly, then it could be said that the marketsare not working well.
The possibility might in that case exist ofobtaining lower exchange
rate variability without cost. There isa wealth of empirical results
that can be brought to bear.—10—
It. RandomWalkIsu1ts
Avariety of different econometric approaches seem to end up at
the same conclusion, that the exchange rate follows a random walk. In
this part of the paper we discuss the apparent Inability to forecast
future changes In the exchange rate using either
(i) the past time series of the process itself (section 11.1),
(ii) macroeconomic fundamentals (section 11.2), or
(iii) the forward exchange market (section 11.3).
We then discuss what else, if anything, can be learned from the
currently popular variance—bounds and bubbles tests.
1. NonstationarIty of Noainal and al Fxchange Rates
It is now widely recognized that the linear time series
representation of the natural logarithm of either spot or forward
exchange rates is best described by a random walk process13 Formal
statistical tests for the presence of a unit root in the autoregressive
representation of the logarithms of spot and forward exchange rates were
first conducted by Meese and Singleton (1982) .Theseunit root tests,
pioneered by Fuller (1976) and his students, are known to have low power
against borderline stationary alternatives. 1-wever, we find the
superior out—of—sample forecasting performance of the random walk model,
over time series models where the unit root Is not imposed, to be power-
ful evidence in favor of the unit root null. Finally, more recent
statistical tests of the unit root hypothesis that are robust to
conditionally heteroskedastic disturbances (Phillips (1985)) also—11—
supportthe unit root hypothesis. This is an importantmethodological
advance, since it is also widely recognized that exchange rate vari-
ability tends to be episodic; see Qimby and Obstfeld (1984) for tests of
conditional heteroskedasticity in nominal exchange rates.'4
Nonstationarity in the nominal exchange rate does not create
problems for standard theories of exchange rate determination. In the
monetary models, if the money supply is nonstationary in levels, or even
in changes, then the exchange rate will be nonstationary in levelsor
changes. We have only to be careful how we specify our econometric
tests of nominal exchange rates, preferring first differences over
levels in general. Nonstationarity in the real exchange rate is
considered by some to be a more serious matter however. If the real
exchange rate follows a random walk, then there is no tendency to return
to purchasing power parity, and seemingly no limit on how far out of
line one country's prices can get from another's.'5
Not long ago, purchasing power parity was widely accepted. It
was argued on a priori grounds that the law of one price should be
enforced at least for traded goods once transport costs were accounted
for: If automobiles were selling at a lower price in Germany than in
the United States, International arbitrageurs should buy them in Germany
and sell them in the United States, raising the price in one country or
lowering it In the other until equality was restored.
The empirical evidence against PPP in level form is overwhelm-
ing. The enormous real appreciation of the dollar in the early l980s
convinced the remaining doubters, but abundant statistical evidence was
there all along. For example, Krugman (1978, p. 406) computed for the— I )_L.
floatingrate period July 1973 —December1976 standard deviations of
the (logarithmic) real exchange rate equal to 6.0 percent for the
pound/dollar rate and 8.4 percent for the mark/dollar rate. He also
computed serial correlation coefficients for PPP deviations of .897 and
.854, respectively, on a monthly basis, equal to .271 and .150 on an
annual basis •Theserial correlation coefficient is of interest because
it is equal to one minus the speed of adjustment to PPP.
Table 1 shows updated annual statistics on the real exchange rate
between the United States and Great Britain. During the floating rate
period 1973—84, there is a significant time trend, and a standard
deviation of I5.4 percent. The serial correlation in the deviations
from PPP is estimated at .720, with a standard error of .248. (The
equation estimated is (er — ) = AR(er—
)+c ,where
t+1 t+1 t t t+1
er is the real exchange rate and er is the long—run equilibrium
level, alternatively estimated as the sample mean or a time trend, and
AR is the autoregressive coefficient.) This means that the estimated
speed of adjustment to PPP is .280 per year and that one can easily
reject the hypothesis of instantaneous adjustment.
From the ashes of PPP, a phoenix has risen. In response to
findings such as those reported here, some authors have swung from one
extreme, the proposit1on that the tendency of the real exchange rate to
return to a constant is complete and instantaneous, to the opposite
extreme that there is no such tendency at all. &t there is even less
of an a priori case why PPP should hold in rate—of—change form than in
the level form.Table 1
Purchasing Power Parity between the United States and the UnitedKingdom
1869—19824
1973—1984 1945—1974 1945—1984 1869—1984
Mean absolute deviation .121 .075 .106 .093
Standard deviation .154 .092 .146 .122
Time trend —.ooi* .006* —.0004 .009
( .0003) C .002) ( .0022) ( .013)
Autoregression
of deviations from mean .720* .706* .829* .860*
( .248) ( .132) C .090) ( .048)
of deviations from trend •734* .710* .750* .846*
( .277) C .133) C .106) ( .050)
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
*Signiflcant at the 95 percent level.—13—
Several authors16 have claimed that the random walk model of the
real exchange rate has a basis in efficient markets theory. Their
argument is apparently that if the expected inflation rate is lower in
the United States than In Germany, allowing for expected exchange rate
changes, then an arbitrageur can contract to buy automobiles In the
United States and ship them to Germany and expect to sell them there at
a higher price; such profitable arbitrage would then eliminate the
opportunity to begin with, enforcing PPP in expected rate—of—change
form. If this arbitrage is intended to be different from the old
arbitrage in level form which has been empirically rejected, and these
authors clearly intend it to be different, then it Is a remarkable
strategy to recommend to international traders. Measures of expected
real depreciation of the dollar as of 1985 showed a short—term depreci-
ation rate of about 1.0 percent per annum. As of 1985, the level of fW
prices was said to be almost twice as high in the United States as in
Germany, as a result of the five—year appreciation of the dollar against
the mark. Yet the apparent strategy tells people to buy 1Ws in the
United States and ship them to Germany because in the three months It
takes to complete the shipment their relative prices will have increased
0.25 percent in expected value! The near—50—percent loss would seem to
outweigh the 0.25—percent gain.
Even though ex ante relative PPP has little basis in theory, it
does appear to have some empirical support. Typically, the estimated
speeds of adjustment during the floating rate period, .27 or .28 on an
annual basis in Table 1 (1973—84), while not so low as to be Implausible
as point estimates, are nevertheless so low that one statistically—14—
cannot reject the hypothesis that they are zero. In otherwords, one
cannot reject the hypothesis that theautoregressive coefficient is 1.0.
A 95—percent confidence interval on theautoregressive
coefficient covers the range 0.17 to 1.27 (in theno—trend case). If
the null hypothesis is an autoregressive coefficientof 1 .0, one cannot
legitimately use the standard t—test derived from aregression where
the right—hand variable is the level of the realexchange rate, because
under the null hypothesis its variance is infinite.There are a number
of ways of dealing with this nonstationarityproblem. Here we simply
apply the corrected Dickey—Fuller (1979) cumulativeprobability distri-
bution for the t—test appropriate for thisproblem. The t—ratio to
test an autoregressive coefficient of 1.0 is 1.13, which fallsfar short
of the Dickey—Fuller 95—percent significancelevel, 3.00.
This failure to reject a random walk in the realexchange rate is
the same result found by Roll (1979), Frenkel (1981,p. 699), Darby
(1981), Adler and Lehman (1983), Mishkin (1984,pp. 1351—53) and Pigott
and Sweeney (1985) .Hakkio(1984) provides evidence of a unit root in
the real exchange rate using the Dickey—Fuller (1979)statistical
procedures. Most of these studies used monthly data rather thanyearly,
and the statistical procedures employed weregenerally not powerful
enough to reject the random walk.'7
A more promising alternative is to choose a longer timesample.
Table 1 also reports statistics for the entirepostwar period 1945—84.
PPP held slightly better during the etton Woodsyears than it did
after 1973, as measured either by the mean absolute deviation and
standard deviation of the real exchange rate, or by the ability to—15—
reject the hypothesis of zero autocorrelation. t,despitethe longer
time sample, one is still unable to reject the random walk. The 95—
percent confidence interval runs from .65 to 1.01, and the t—ratio of
1 .9 falls short of the Dlckey—Fuller 95—percent significance level of
2 .93.
The last column of Table 1 presents an entire 116 years of U.S.—
U.K. data. With this long a time sample, the standard error is reduced
considerably. The rejection of no serial correlation in the real
exchange rate Is even stronger than in the shorter time samples. More
important, one is finally able to detect a significant tendency for the
real exchange rate to regress to PPP, at a rate of 14 percent a year.
The confidence interval for AR runs from .77 to .95, safely less than
unity, and the t—ratio of 2.92 exceeds the Dickey—Fuller significance
level of 2.89.
If the speed of adjustment to PPP is indeed on the order of 20
percent a year, and the standard deviation of the real exchange rate is
on the order of .15, then the standard deviation of new shocks is on the
order of /1 —.802)(.152) =10percent. With such a large error term
in the regression equation, it is not surprising that most econonietri—
clans have been unable statistically to reject zero adjustment using the
data from a mere 14 years of post—1973 data. The tests simply have
insufficient power. This conclusion is supported by Monte Carlo tests
as performed by Hakkio (1986). He hypothesizes an ARIMA (1,1,2) process
for the real exchange rate (with the first—order autoregressive coef-
ficient equal to .9) and manufactures 100 months of data. He finds that
the standard tests are not powerful enough to reject the randomwalk.'8—16--
The problem distinguishing betweena stationary and a random walk
process can be considered by calculating anapproximate value of sample
size N that would give rise toa 95 percent confidence interval for
AR (the first order autoregressive
coefficient) that excludes the value
one. With a little hand—waving and theuse of the conventional formula
for the variance of the estimate ofAR these values of N would be
roughly 156, 196, and 759 for actual values ofAR equal to .95, .96,
and .99 respectively. N=156 isroughly the number of months in the
modern floating rate period. In terms ofthe half—life of deviations
from PPp it would take about 13,16, and 68 observations (months) for 50
percent of the deviations from PPP to disappear, whenAR for the real
exchange rate was .95, .96 and .99respectively.
Thus in our view the evidence fora unit root in real exchange
rates is much less convincing than the evidencefor a unit root in
nominal exchange rates, suggesting that PPPis still a reasonable anchor
for long—run exchange rateexpectations.
The implications of thenonstationarity of the logarithms of
nominal exchange rates and the nearnonstationarity of the real exchange
rate for tests of spot rate determination,forward rate bias, and
variance bounds will be discussed at theappropriate places in the next
three sub—sections respectively.
2. gress1onsof &changete1ter1natjon
Regressions of equations of exchange rate determinationwere the
first sort of tests to become popular inthe iuld—l970s. The flexible—
price monetary model,'9 for example, was represented by theequation—17—
(8) s =
— +X(i_i*) + u
where s is the log of the spot exchange rate (domestic currency!
foreign), mt is the log of the domestic money supply relative to the
foreign, " is the log of domestic income relative to foreign,
(i_i*) is the interest differential, and u is the regression
error. The model is derived from the assumption of instantaneous
adjustment and perfect substitutability in the goods market (implying
purchasing power parity) as well as in the bond market (implying
uncovered interest parity) 2O Under the assumptions, (i_i*)t could as
easily be replaced by the forward discount fdt, or by investors'
expected rate of depreciation ts.
(9) s =m
— +X(s) +
Intuitively, an increase in the relative supply of the domestic
currency m will lower its value, or raise the price of foreign
currency s. Anything that raises the relative demand for domestic
currency, like an Increase in relative income y or a decreasein
expected future capital losses will have the opposite effect.
Other authors argued that important elements were missing from
the equation. As we saw in the last section, deviations from purchasing
power parity are in fact very large. If they were purely random, they
could just be subsumed in the regression error u (as could random
shifts in money demand) .&itwe also saw that they are in fact highly
autocorrelated. If the deviations are thought to have an
autocorrelation coefficient of 1, i.e., If the real exchange rate is—18—
thought to follow a random walk, we have the version ofthe monetary
model used by feese (1986).Theequation could simply be estimated on
first differences. the other hand, if deviations from PPP arise
primarily from price level stickiness and thus arethought to be damped
over time, e.g., to follow an AR(1), and ifexpectations correctly
reflect this tendency to return to long—runequilibrium, then a more
complete model is needed. The real interest differential,which is
equal to expected real depreciation, will be proportionateto the
current deviation from equilibrium.2' In the sticky—pricemonetary
niodel,22 we can simply add the real interestdifferential
e **e
(i—u)— (i), toequation (8): When the interest differential
rises without a rise in expected inflation (lTe)itattracts an
incipient capital inflow that causes thecurrency to appreciate. The
coefficient is 1/9, where 0 is the expected rate ofadjustment of
the spot rate to equilibrium.
Another alternative to the simple monetary model is the
portfolio—balance model23 which relaxed the assumption of uncovered
interest parity, and as a consequence introduced the stocksof bonds
into the model. Some synthesis versions requiredonly adding a variable
for the cumulation of government deficits and currentaccount deficits
to the earlier equations 24
These models have all been grouped under the name "asset market
approach" because they all assume that exchange rates are determined in
financial markets in which investors are able to shift theirasset
holdings instantaneously. it is important to note that the models
already build in a high degree of exchange rate volatility, even without—19—
any special factors such as irrational expectations, speculative bub-
bles, or an error term. In the flexible—price monetary model, for
example, a one percent change in the money supply will have a more—than—
proportionate effect on the contemporaneous exchange rate, if it leads
investors to expect more money growth and currency depreciation in the
future. (This has been called the magnification effect.)
In the sticky—price overshooting model of Dornbusch, even a
onetime change in the money supply can have a more—than—proportionate
effect, because it transitorily lowers the interest rate and as a result
drives the value of the currency below the new long—run equilibrium
level.25 Sometimes, especially in policy circles, the overshooting
model has been mistakenly invoked to support the idea that irrationality
or speculative bubbles increase exchange rate variability. &t most
readers of the Dornbusch paper have realized that its beauty lies
precisely in the fact that overshooting occurs even when investors
behave well in the sense that their speculation equates the forward
discount to the rationally expected rate of depreciation. Indeed, when
expectations are rational in the Dornbusch model, the conditional
variance of the spot rate is given by
2
(10) (1 +-—-) c
where isthe variance of changes in the money supply.26 There is a
sense in which this much volatility, if not necessarily optimal for the
allocation of resources (a question on which we have demurred), is a
natural and inevitable consequence of money supply changes in a sticky—
price world.—20—
The econometric evidence from regression tests can only be
interpreted as saying that either expected depreciation is not
adequately captured by the forward discount (or Interest differential),
or else there is some other substantial error term u in an equation
like (8) that will enter the variance of s in addition to the
fundamentals variables. e can always postulate the existence of
variables that must have been incorrectly omitted, as the real interest
differential would be if the sticky—price monetary model is correct but
equation (8) is tested without it. &t it is fair to say that every
equation that has been proposed, or that is likely to be proposed in the
future, has a substantial error term left over. Much- has been made
(appropriately) of the models' inability to predict out—of—sample. &lt
many of the regression estimates have shown very poor fits, not to
mention unsensible coefficients, within the sample period as well. Even
for the sample period during which the sticky—price monetary model fit
the mark/dollar data remarkably well, the R2 was only .80.27
Subsequent sample periods usually showed less sensible coefficients and
worse fits for all varieties of models (except when a lagged endogenous
variable Is used. In such cases a more informative goodness of fit
statistic would be one that measured the contribution of the explanatory
variables after accounting for the past history of the spot rate.)28
Unsensible coefficients are often attributable to endogeneity of
rlghthand side variables. For example, negative coefficients on the
money supplies can be attributed to central bank reaction to the
exchange rate when setting monetary policy. Income, interest rates and
other variables are also almost certainly endogenous 29 Unsensible—21—
coefficients would in turn explain the inability to predict even
directions of movement out—of—sample. Such econometric problems have
encouraged many to go on to other testing procedures, such as those
discussed in later sections. &t it is Important to note at this stage
that the endogeneity problems alone cannot explain the poor fits •To
see this, one need not rely on instrumental variables estimates, which
are only as good as the instruments used. One can impose a unit coef-
ficient on the money supply and reasonable values on the other coeffi-
cients; the fits are still poor.3° In the limit, if the error term
in the regression were indeed always close to zero, one should get a
perfect fit regardless of whether the rIghthand—side variables are
determined in other equations. This is true even If sophisticated
theories of the expectations term are built from rational expectations,
speculative bubbles, etc. Assuming expected depreciation is measurable
by the forward discount, then some function of the forward discount and
other fundamentals should give a good fit, unless there are large
omitted factors.
Why emphasize so much the poor fits? The first reason is it
already gives us our first conclusion: no set of macroeconomic vari-
ables that has been proposed is capable of explaining a very high
percentage of the variation in the exchange rate. One can always postu-
late, In the manner of "real business cycle theory" some unobservable
portfolio shifts or productivity shocks that must be determining the
exchange rate. &it if the shocks cannot be measured or even described
meaningfully, then they probably belong in the error term u. Our
conclusion that the magnitude of u Is large Is evidence, for example,—22—
undermining any defense of exchange rate variability made on the grounds
that it is appropriate given changes in monetary policy. If all
exchange rate changes were in truth explainable by changes in money sup-
plies, either contemporaneous or anticipated, we would have much better
results In our regressions of the monetary equation (1) than we do.
The second reason why we flag here the poor fits and simultaneity
problems is that some of the alternative tests that econometricianshave
turned to, though seemingly more sophisticated than these regressions,
are very sensitive to the assumed behavior of the error term.These are
the variance—bounds and bubbles tests, which are discussed in section
11.4 below.
Faced with poor econometric results for our models based on
macroeconomic fundamentals, the proper response is to test components of
the models in isolation. (It is not to test the models jointly with
other assumptions!) Tests of unbiasedness in the forward market are one
such approach, as almost all of the models include rational expectations
as a key element, or at least as a special case. They arealso thought
to shed light on the question whether the forward discount can
legitimately be used to measure expected depreciation. We now turnto
these tests
3.InterpretIng 1sts of Biasinthe Forward Discount
The literature testing the unbiasedness of the forward discount
is by now truly voluminous. Typically, the ex post error made bythe
forward discount in predicting the change in the spot rate is regressed
against information available at the beginningof the period, such as—23—
the lagged prediction error.3' It often turns out that a statistically
significant portion of the prediction errors can be explained using the
available information, which constitutes a rejection of the null hypo-
thesis of unbiasedness.
The most common test in this literature takes the forward dis-
count itself to be the information set on which expectations are
conditioned.32 The regression equation is
(11) As÷1 =a+bfd +
Underthe null hypothesis that the forward discount is an unbiased
predictor of actual depreciation, the coefficient b should be one.33
It is important to consider tests of the bias in the forward rate
in difference rather than levels form. Earlier versions of the test
regressed the level of the realized future spot rate against the level
of the forward rate.34 The argument in favor of the difference versions
of the forward rate bias test can be made as follows •Sincethe loga-
rithms of the levels of spot and forward rates contain unit roots, each
of these series are highly autocorrelated. In addition, the sample
contemporaneous cross correlation of the log levels of spot and forward
rates is essentially one, over any subset of the modern floating rate
period. This common stochastic trend in the log levels of spot and
forward rates ensures that they are highly cross—correlated, even when
the two series are sampled at slightly different points in time.
Finally, the sample variance estimates of the log levels of spot and
forward rates are essentially the same over any subset of the recent
floating rate period. These "empirical regularities" guarantee that the—24—
slope coefficient from a regression of on will be near
unity, as this coefficient is equal to the sample correlation coeffi-
cient when the variables have the same sample variance. In modern time
series parlance, the log levels of spot and forward rates are cointe—
grated with a cointegrating constant near unity. The set of empirical
regularities that suggests the levels regression will have a coefficient
near one has no implications for either of the difference versions of
the forward rate bias test.35
The null hypothesis in equation (11) is usually rejected. The
coefficient is significantly less than one; the implication is that one
could expect to make money by betting against the forward discount
whenever it is nonzero. Often the estimated coefficient is close to
zero or even negative, which would say that the forward discount does
not even get the direction of movement of the exchange rate right.
Bilson (1981) interprets this finding as "excessive speculation:"
investors would do better if they would routinely reduce toward zero the
magnitude of their expectations of exchange rate changes.
Most economists have not followed Bilson in the large step from
the statistical finding of bias to the conclusion that the rational
expectations hypothesis should be rejected. The economist's usual a
priori argument——that any incipient opportunity for earning excessive
profits would quickly attract investors who would eliminate it——is
considered sufficiently strong that other explanations for the finding
of bias are sought.
Easily the most common explanation given is exchange risk. Risk—
averseinvestors will demand some extra expected return for taking an—25—
open position in a currency that they perceive asriskier.36 Whether or
not the optimal statistical predictor equals the expectation that inves-
tors have in mind (rational expectations), if the investors' expectation
is not in turn equal to the forward rate (because of a risk premium
separating them), then the forward raje will be biased. This explana-
tion is discussed at some length in Part III.
Here we discuss two other explanations that are sometimes given
for the finding of bias in the forward rate. One is easily covered.
Under the joint null hypothesis of rational expectations and risk
neutrality, it is expected real profits that should be zero; but the
condition usually tested is the absence of expected nominal profits.
The reason for the distinction is not that goods price indices are
different in different countries. The same price index, determined by
whatever consumption basket is relevant for the investor in question,
should be applied to both currencies. The problem is rather that the
price index goes in the denominator of the expression for the expected
real value of an asset, and by Jensen's Inequality it does not drop out
of the expected difference in returns on countries' assets. (This is
the resolution of the famous "Siegel's Paradox;" see Frankel and Razin
(1980), Fngel (1984) or the references cited in these papers for a more
complete explanation.) Doing the tests in real terms rather than
nominal does not seem to make much difference however. This is what one
would expect from the fact that the short—term variability of goods
prices is much smaller than the variability of exchange rate; presumably
it is also true that uncertainty regarding goods prices is much smaller
than uncertainty regarding exchange rates. Indeed, in the special case—26--
where goods prices are nonstochastic when expressed in the currency of
the producer country and the spot rate is distributed log—normally, the
usual method of running the regression on logs of the nominal spot and
forward rate is exactly correct .
Amore serious obstacle to interpreting findings of forward rate
bias as evidence against the joint hypothesis of rational expectations
and risk neutrality is the "peso problem." As is widely known by now,
the peso problem arises when there is the possibility of a large depre-
ciation in the currency contingent on an exogenous event that may not
have occurred in the sample period. In the context of the surprisingly
sustained period of dollar appreciation in the early 1980s, with the
forward market all the while forecasting a depreciation, it has been
suggested that either the collapse of a rational speculative bubble or a
sudden shift in the fiscal and monetary policy mix could be such an
exogenous event. Unfortunately, the term "peso problem" is sometimes
used indiscriniinantly to explain away any rejections of unbiasedness,
leaving one to wonder why the test is run in the first place. It is
important to remind ourselves of the familiar fact that standard
statistical significance tests take into account the possibility of an
event by chance failing to occur in the sample. (This assumes that the
sample period was dictated by exogenous considerations such as data
availability, as Is the case in most of the tests.) One cannot say, for
example, that "the forward market repeatedly mis—forecast the apprecia-
tion of the dollar in 1981—84 because it could not know that the White
House or Qrngress would repeatedly fail to correct the structural budget
deficit." If investors repeatedly mis—forecast fiscal policy in the—27—
same direction, that itself Is a violation of the rational expectations
hypothesis.
The correct definition of the peso problem is that, because of
the possibility of a discretely—large change in the exchange rate, a
usually—respectable number of observations might not in fact be large
enough to give an approximately normal distribution to the coefficient
estimate, with the result that the usual significance levels applied to
the t—statistic may be inappropriate.38 When one suspects that such a
failure of normality may be a problem, one response is to use tests that
do not require that distributional assumption. Nonparametric tests of
the dollar in the 1981—1985 period show that statistical rejections of
unbiasedriess need not necessarily depend on normality: the dollar re-
peatedly moved upward in value while the forward discount was predicting
the reverse (Frankel (l985b), Evans (1986)). It is true, however, that
nonparanietric tests frequently depend on a random sampling assumption.
If we leave behind Jensen's Inequality and the peso problem, the
exchange risk premium remains the major explanation——short of a
rejection of rational expectations——for the findings of bias In the
forward rate. We will consider exchange risk, and the information to be
gained from the theory of portfolio optimization, in Part III.
4. Variance &unds andB.ibbles1ksts
Variance bounds tests have been found intuitively appealing for
two reasons. First, they have the appearance of more generality than
regression tests. Second, they appear to hook up neatly with the
popular feeling——which is the main motivation of the present study——that
markets have been in some sense too volatile.—28—
It has been pointed out repeatedly that the variance—bounds and
bubbles tests require the assumption that the economic fundamentals have
been correctly identified. Hamilton and Whiteman (1986) criticize the
bubble tests on the grounds that "one can always relax restrictions on
the dynamics of the fundamental driving variables so as to interpret
what appears to be a speculative bubble as instead having arisen from
rational agents responding solely to economic fundamentals not observed
by the econornetrician." Similarly, Meese (1986) and Flood, Hodrickand
Kaplan (1986, p. 32) argue that the tests are actually tests of the
joint hypothesis of (1) a correct model, (ii) no regime changes,and
(iii) no bubbles.
These criticisms have also been levelled at the variance—bounds
tests applied to the stock market by Shiller (1981). For example, Marsh
and Merton (1986) argue that their assumption about the dynamic process
governing the payout of dividends will result in a violation of
Shiller's sample variance bounds even when the simple stock price
present value is in fact true. &it it has not entirely sunk in,for the
case of the foreign exchange market, how damaging is the dependenceof
the tests on having correctly specified the macroeconomic fundamentals.
(The same could be said for specifying the money demand function cor-
rectly in tests of hyperinflation.) In the case of the stock market, at
least modelling the price as the present discounted value of expected
future dividends is fairly airtight, subject only to the possible
problem of a risk premium.39
We now spell Out briefly the steps in deriving a bubbles test,
starting from a model such as equation (9), and the perilsthat lie—29—
therein. If agents are assumed to have rational expectations, Ase




Equation (9') could be estimated by McCallum's (1976) method of replac-
ing Est+i by the expost realization st+1 plus a random prediction
error et and then using an instrumental variables (IV) technique
such as Generalized Method of Moments or two—step two—stage least
squares. Alternatively, if the regression error were thought to be
small relative to the expectational error it would be preferable
to solve for before estimating.




Equation(9') or (9'') will hold——under the joint hypothesis of rational
expectations and the rest of the model——regardless whether there is a
speculative bubble term or not.
To test the special case of no bubble, we estimate the model a
different way. We solve for s as a function of expectations:
1 A 1
(12) St = m
—r '
+jr(Es+i) + Ut
We then note that
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substituteinto (12), and continue to substitute recursively. The well—
known result is that the (no—bubble) solution for today's exchange rate
can be written as the present discounted sum of the entire expected—30--
future path of monetary conditions:
T * x I
(13) s = (Tj-)(-)E+T —t+T+ t+T
For example, if far—sighted agents expect an increase inthe money
supply to take place four years in the future, itwill have an effect on
the exchange rate today. The reason is that they expectthe currency to
depreciate (whether in terms of goods or foreign currency)in four
years, and thus expect that agents inthree years will seek to move out
of domestic currency in anticipation of capital losses, causing a
depreciation in that period. Agents in two yearswill in turn seek to
move out of domestic currency, and so on. The depreciationis passed
all the way back to the present.
Note that setting the price of foreign exchange to the present
discounted sum of expected future monetary conditions (wherethe
discount factor is iI(1+x)) is analogous to themodel In the stock
market that sets the price of equity to the presentdiscounted value of
expected future dividends (where the discount factoris one over one
plus the real interest rate) .Themajor difference is that we are much
less confident about having the right fundamentals inthe foreign
exchange market. In addition, estimation of equation(13) requires that
the disturbance term u be uncorrelated with the appropriatelydated
fundamentals (or else an IV procedure must beutilized40)
Equation (13) gives only the particularfundamentals solution,
which sets the coefficient on the speculative bubble termto zero. The
intent of the bubbles tests is to test the equation againstthe
alternative more general solution—31—
(14) s =s
+
where a is any stochastic process satisfying E,a+ =a
.The
extra term can arise from self—fulfilling expectations: if everyone
expects the dollar to appreciate, even if for a reason unrelated to
fundamentals ("sunspots"), they will buy dollars and drive up the price,
so that the expectation turns out to have been rational. In a single
deterministic bubble of the sort Flood and Garber (1980) test for,
a is a constant •Witthere are other possibilities. In the
stochastic bubble model of Rianchard and Watson (1982) at has a
probability of collapsing to zero each period.
The next step in the bubbles tests of West (1984), Meese (1986)
and Casella (1985) is a non—trivial assumption in any context: some
stable dynamic process must be assumed for the fundamentals variables
and y, such as a vector autoregression. Then the Hansen—Sargent
(1980) prediction formula can be applied to (13) so that the expected
future values of m and are substituted out. This results in a
multiple equation system with nonlinear cross equation constraints that
we shall refer to as (13').
The trick behind the bubbles test Is the recognition that under
the null hypothesis of "no bubble term" the estimator of the parameters
of equations (13') will be more efficient than the estimator of the
parameters of equation (9') .Underthe alternative hypothesis that
there is a bubble term as in equation (14), the estimator of the
parameters of equation (9') will still be consistent, whereas the
estimator of the parameters of equations (13') will be inconsistent.—32—
Thus a Hausman (1978) specification test can be used to choose between
the two possibilities.
At least four propositions are being maintained when estimating
the system (13'); (a) the macroeconomic model such as equation (8) is
correct, (b) the interest differential or forward discountis an
unbiased predictor in the sense of equalling the realization within the
sample period, up to a random prediction error (this requiresrational
expectations, no peso problem or regime changes, and norisk premium),41
(c) there are no bubbles, and (d) the dynamic model assumedfor the
explanatory variables is correct. (The last assumption canbe checked
independently using standard procedures.) Assumptions (a)and (b) are
also maintained when estimating (9') .Thusthe bubbles test procedure
only makes sense if diagnostic checks of the estimatedfit of (9') do
not indicate misspecification. Testing propositions (c) and (d)while
maintaining (a) and (b) has the obvious difficulty thatif the null
hypothesis Is rejected one does not know why. &it Inthe present
context, it seems particularly tenuous, since propositions(a) and (b)
can be tested individually, and few people interpretthe evidence as
supporting them.
In addition, the small sample properties of the bubble specifi-
cation test have been questioned (in the context of the presentvalue
relation for stock prices) by Mattey and Meese (1987) .Intheir sitnu—
lation experiments the nonparametric tests for bubbles turned out tobe
much more reliable tests for the presence of bubbles than the specifi—
cation test. Evans (1986) has employed nonparametric testsof bubbles—33.—
on the dollar—pound exchange rate over the recent floating rate period,
and reports finding a bubble in the dollar—pound rate.
We now consider the weaknesses of variance bound tests •We
repeat equation (1), or its incarnation as the monetary model equation
(9), as
s =+ —s)
where is the sensitivity of the current spot rate to the expected
change in the spot rate (the same as A, the semi—elasticity of money
demand, in the monetary model), and denotes all the fundamentals.
Now the results from Meese and Singleton (1983) allow us to deduce
(15) var(s) < var(i)
in the absence of exchange market bubbles. }re can include the
structural disturbance u in (1) or the variance bound can be taken
after projecting s and on an information set that excludes
u. The variance bound in (15) can be written in termsof conditional
variances or, if equation (9') holds in first differences with u as
the structural disturbance, then a bound analogous to (15) holds for the
first difference of s and Thus nonstationarity of the
exchange rate or fundamentals will not undermine the following discus-
sion. The relation (15) makes It clear that It is meaningless to com-
pare the variability of s with an individual component of
unless SL contains a single variable, or we know all the values of the
structural parameters on the variables in and the covariances
between all the fundamentals. Actual variance bounds tests of (1) are—34—
generally uninteresting because they test whether thevariance of a
linear combination of the variables in 5L is an upper bound onthe
variance of s, and the tests are conditioned on knowing the correct
variables and the correct values of the structural coefficients.While
it is true that the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodologyof
Hansen (1982) can be used to construct a statistical test of (15)that
incorporates the sampling variability of theestimated parameters, this
has not been done in the exchange rate context •Webelieve that such an
exercise is futile since It is already known that asset marketmodels of
exchange rate determination fit poorly.
A more obvious problem with variance bounds tests can be seen
from the application of variance bounds procedures to testsof forward
rate bias. Recall that the unbiasedness equation
(16) s+i =a+ b(fd) + with b =1implies
(17) var(As+i) > var(fd)
The variance bounds test has no power to detect thealternative
cov(fdi c) =cov{fd,(s
—f)]> 0, since (17) would hold a
fortiori .Themost common empirical finding in regression testsof (16)
is that cov(As÷i fd) < 0 which also implies that cov(fdt, ct+1< o.42
However, the variance of the lefthand sideof (17) is typically so much
larger than the variance of the righthandside that a test of (17) fails
to uncover a significant negative covarianceof the forward discount
with the forecast error Forexample, take the published results
in Huang (1984) •Hisregressiontests of (16), reported in his Table 1
(p. 157), indicate two rejectionsof b =1when < o and one—35—
rejection of b =1when b > 0, out of a total of nine currencies.
In his following Table 4 (p. 160), none of the variance bounds tests
reject (17) for the same currencies and sample periods. It is true that
all of Huang's point estimates of the bound
var(ts+i) > var(e1)
are violated, but none of the violations is statistically significant.
These "small sample" results illustrate the large—sample theoretical
results of Fraukel and Stock (1987) who show that the most powerful
conditional volatility test is equivalent to the analogous regression
test in terms of asymptotic power. See also Froot (1987)
Finally, we conclude this section by noting that it is the lower
variance bound on the forward rate (or forward discount) that is
violated in exchange markets, not the upper bound. Properties of
conditional variances allow us to deduce var(f)var(s) where
Stisthe predictor of s based on the limited informatin set of past
spot rates. The forward rate is the predictor of the spot based on the
market's larger information set. (The regression analogy is that R2
cannot decrease when you add explanatory variables.) Since the variance
of the prediction error from forecasting s on just its own past value
is less than the variance of the prediction error from forecasting the
spot rate with the market's forecast, the lower variance bound on
the forward rate is violated. (See for example the root mean square
error statistics in Meese and Rogoff (1983a) for the forward rate versus
the random walk model as predictors of future spot rates and the other
results discussed in section 11.3.)—36—
III. The change Risk Pre1ua
Weare interested in the size and variability of therisk premium
for two reasons •Firstif the size and variability are thought to be
small, as argued in Frankel (1986a), then it is difficult toattribute
the results of regression tests of forward rate unbiasedness (described
in section 11.3), or the results of variance bounds tests (describedin
section 11.4), to the risk premium. This would leave onlythe explana-
tion that expectations cannot be assumed rational (in the senseof
lending themselves to representation by the ex post sample
distribution)
Even if expectations are thought to be rational, thereIs a
second motivation for looking at the variability of therisk premium.
Since the risk premium, rp in equation (2), togetherwith the
substitutability parameter ,canbe a key determinant of the exchange
rate, estimating the variability of therisk premium will help us
analyze the sources of variability in the spot rate Here we will
be particularly interested in the effects on swhen there is an
exogenous change in asset supplies L,expectations As, or the
substitutability parameter .
Untilrelatively recently, empirical work on the risk premiumwas
limited almost entirely to the estimates of bias inthe forward market's
prediction of future spot rates discussedin section 11.3. The problem
was that rational expectations had to beassumed a priori in order to
interpret the systematic component ofthe prediction errors as equal to
the risk premium. For those who were willing tomake that assumption,—37—
the conclusion was that the risk premium is large and variable. For
example, the finding of zero coefficients in the regression of exchange
rate changes against the forward discount implied that the rationally
expected rate of depreciation was zero (random walk), and 100 percent of
the forward discount was made up by the risk premium, rather than by
expected depreciation. Since the dollar's forward discount against the
mark or yen has moved over a range of roughly 2 percent to 4 percent in
recent years, this would imply that the risk premium was substantial in
both magnitude and variability.
It has been argued that if the systematic component of the
prediction errors is indeed properly interpreted as the risk premium,
then it ought to be related statistically to those variables on which
theory tells us that the risk premium depends. We now turn to the
theoretical determinants of the risk premium and the corresponding
econometric tests.
1. Implications of Portfolio—Optimization with Qnstant Variance
If investors maximize single period utility that is a function of
mean and variance of end of period wealth, asset demands can be written
as a linear function of expected relative rates of returns:
(3') x =A—Brp
where = pc2and A is the minimum variance portfolio. The
parameter p is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and c is
the variance (covariance matrix in general) of exchange returns.
Several authors43 have inverted equation (3') without imposing the—38—
theoretical restrictions of mean—variance analysis, andhave attempted
to explain the ex post risk pretniuni (forecast errors) byvariables to
which portfolio balance theory says that the risk premiumshould be
related. This line of research has uniformly found norelation
between rp and x. The difficulty n predicting ex postrisk premiums
by asset shares can be appreciated by inspecting figures1—5, where the
two variables are plotted for five currencies versusthe dollar over
April 1973 to December 1984. The mean driftsin the Japanese, German,
French and British shares are not accompanied by meandrifts in the
corresponding excess return variables.
Using the constraints implied by mean—varianceanalysis, and
reasonable coefficient estimates for the parameters in (3t)Frankel
(1986a) has argued that the exchange rate risk premium(and also its
variability) must be very small. The argument can besummarized as
follows: the unconditional monthly variance of therelative return on
dollars over the period August 1973 —August1980 is roughly .001.If
we take .001 as an upper bound on theconditional variance of relative
dollar returns, and a coefficient on risk aversion equalto two, then
the term tpc]is .002. An increase in the supply of foreign assets
equal to 1% of the portfolio would only requirean increase in the risk
premium of 2.4 basis points on an annualbasis!44 The argunient does,
however, assume that the conditional varianceof returns is constant; we
take up this subject in the next subsection.
Hansen and Idr1ck (1983), and Wdrick and Srivastava(1984,
1986), among others, have attempted to conductinference regarding the
magnitude and variability of the risk premium using amore general—39--
intertemporal utility valuation model of the risk premium. In this
setting a linear equation relating asset supiles to the risk premium
would only obtain if investors' preferences were logarithmic or asset
returns are interternporally independent. We would not a priori expect
to be able to explain the risk premium by relative asset shares alone,
so these models offer an alternative theory of rp.
The intertemporal general equilibrium model of Lucas (1982), as
amended by Fbdrick and Srivastava (1984), can be used to derive a
relation between the forward rate and the expected future spot rate.
While this model relies on some very restrictive assumptions, It
provides considerable insight into the nature of the exchange rate risk
premium. In this type of individual utility maximization model the
equilibrium price of an asset Is found by equating the foregone marginal
utility from purchasing an asset to the conditional expectation of the
present discounted value of the marginal utility of return from holding
the asset. In order to price a nominal forward exchange contract, money
is introduced into the asset pricing model by the restriction that
agents purchase a country's idiosyncratic endowment with that country's
money. Arbitrage ensures that the next period forward price of foreign
exchange be equal to the expected present value of a known return at
time t of investing in a nominally risk free bond with payoff in
period t+l, i, multiplied by the spot rate that will prevail in the
next period, The asset pricing model provides the interpretation
of the discount factor as the interteinporal marginal rate of substitu-
tion (Richard and Sundaresan (1981)) between period t and t+l
dollars, +1' where, for convenience, a U.S. perspective has been-40-
adopted. Thus the forward rate can be written as:
(18) =
Usingthe definition of conditional covariance, (18) may be
rewritten as: -
(19) =E{st+ijI(t)]+ cov[Q+ii, s11I]
where cov[ .,.1I] denotes covariance conditional on the information
set I, and the derivation of (19) makes use of the first order
condition for utility maximization E[ Q I =1.The second term
t t+1 t t
on the righthand side of (19) has the Interpretation of a risk premium.
However, it is useful to Introduce a benchmark return, i1, defined
explicitly in Hansen and Hodrick (1983), so that (19) can be rewritten




where is the conditional covariance of the risk premium and
benchmark return divided by the conditional variance of the benchmark
return.
Implications of this model have been tested by Hansen and Hodrick
(1983), Hodrick and Srivastava (1984, 1986) and cumby (1986), among
others. Ekapirical work is typically conducted assuming that conditional
second moments and/or do not vary across time. While statistical
tests of the "consumption beta" model usually indicate a rejection of
the model, qualitative features of the data are explained by this para-
digm; see the discussion in Oimby (1986) .Wenow turn our attention to—41—
the implications of time variation in return second moments on variabil-
ity of the risk premium and in turn on the variability of the spot rate.
2. Implications of lime—Varying turn (bvariance8
Anumber of authors have in effect argued that the assumption of
a constant covariance matrix of exchange returns should berelaxed.45
Pagan (1986) argues, in a context where the conditional variance changes
over time, that there may be some points when it exceeds the sample
variance (.01 on an annual basis), and that the risk premium at such a
point will exceed the upper bound claimed in Frankel (1986a) .Witif we
allow the conditional variance to vary over time, then one can still
apply the upper bound to the average conditional variance and therefore
to the average risk premium. If the conditional variance is 10 times
larger than .01 one period in ten (for example, when the preceding
squared realization was particularly large), then it is true that a one
percent change in the portfolio in that period will change the risk
premium by as much as 0.2 percent per annum, and that the magnitude of
the risk premium could be as large as 20 percent annum (if close to 100
percent of the portfolio is in one asset or the other) .Witin the
other nine periods out of ten, these magnitudes would have to be zero
for the variance to average out to .01.
When we allow for return variances to vary over time, variation
in the risk premium derives from this additional source and can thus
exhibit considerable volatility. This point is made by Giovannini and
Jorion (1986) .Ifwe are interested in the question of how big an
effect foreign exchange intervention has on average, then the—42—
observation that the conditional variance and the risk premium may at
times be higher and at times lower maynotbe very relevant. &it for
other questions, such as explaining the variability of the exchange
rate, the observation that the risk premium changes overtime is quite
relevant.
Recent work by Oiiaby and Obstfeld (1984), Hsieh (1984), Domowitz
and Hakkio (1985), and Giovannini and Jorion (1987a), rejects the hypo-
thesis that the conditional variance of exchange returns is constant
over time. Supporting evidence is provided by Implicitvariances
extracted from options data in studies by Lyons (1986) and Hsiehand
Manas—Anton (1986): these estimated variances, which are to be thought
of as characterizing Investor's conditional beliefs, clearly vary over
time.
Giovannini and Jorion (1987a) specify the conditional variance as
a function of the levels of domestic and foreigninterest rates. Their
aim is to argue that their estimate of variation in theconditional
variance corresponds to large variation in the risk premium,In contrast
to Frankel (1986a) .&itthey appear to have fallen into a (remarkably
common) pitfall in their calculations: their estimates imply atrue
variance of the monthly risk premium equal to 1.1 x1O, not 1.1
(Giovannini and Jorlon, 1987b)
Perhaps the most popular approach to modelingthe conditional
variance of returns Is to employ variants of Engle's (1982)autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) process •Inthe context
of the single period mean—variance model, Engeland Rodriguez (1987)
show how to extend the econometric procedure ofFrankel (1982) to—4')—
account for time variation in return second moments. However, the basic
message for the relation between asset shares and the risk premiumis
unaltered when the Engel—Rodriguez procedure is employed.
Table 2 provides evidence of the variability in exchange return
second moments; the maximum, minimum, and average values of the sample
standard deviations and correlations are tabulated for a sample of 100
months. The autocorrelatlon function of the annualized standard devi-
ation of exchange return calculated from the $/DM rate is displayed in
Table 3. The pattern of autocorrelations in Table 3 is typical of all
21 elements in the second moment matrices displayed in Table 2. A
reasonable characterization of this process is simple exponential
smoothing or an ARIMA (0,1,1):
(21) — =+ ÷ 016t—1with =
Theestimate of varies by currency second moment, but =—.9is
robust to the series under analysis. The stochastic model (21) implies
that all shocks to the standard error of exchange return second
moments are permanent. The large negative coefficient on implies
that after one period, the level of the standard deviation of return is
increased by 10% of the initial shock forever.
We are now ready to consider the implications of time variation
in return second moments for the larger question of exchange rate
determination. We can infer the effects of changes in exchange rate
return variance on the demand for asset shares by looking at our
equation for the optimally—diversified portfolio:Table 2
Exchange Rate Return Second Moments
Monthly Echange Returns Calculated from Daily Observations
over the period December 1977 —April1986
(Monthly return standard deviations run down the diagonal,
and monthly correlations are displayed off the diagonal.)
The following entries are maximum values over the sample of 100 months:
Australian Dollar 36.24
British Pound .94 45.23
Canadian Dollar .81 .85 14.80
German Mark .93 .96 .82 49.87
Japanese Yen .93 .93 .77 .96 23 .78
Swiss Franc .93 .94 .83 .99 .95 42.58
The following entries are minimum values over the sample of 100 months:
Australian Dollar 1.70
British Pound —.46 2.42
Canadian Dollar —.46 —.63 .76
German Mark —.63 —.42 —.72 2.72




—.65 —.20 —.04 3 .02
The following entries are average values over the sample of 100 months:
AustralianDollar 6.69
British Pound .34 10.91
Canadian Dollar .19 .25 4.03
German Mark .37 .60 .26 11.06
JapaneseYen .42 .43 .22 .62 9 .89
Swiss Franc .39 .58 .27 .81 .63 13.07
Notes: A daily rate of return is defined as (s(t) —s(t—1))/s(t—1)for t
inthe same month. All monthly return standard deviations are expressed as
annual percentages and are calculated as if daily returns within a month
constitute a random sample.Table 3
Autocorrelation Functions for the Level and Difference
of Return Volatility
Level of Standard Deviation of $/DM Annual Return: ,/ci
Meanof Ii= 11.06 Sample Variance of I?i= 50.05 Sample Size =100
Autocorrelatlon Autocorrelation
1 .14 7 .14
2 .16 8 .07
3 .29* 9 ,Ø5
4 .09 10 .11
5 .07 11 .02
6 .04 12 —.03






1 _.52* 7 .11
2 —.06 8 —.04
3 .19 9 —.04
4 —.11 10 .08
5 .01 11 —.02
6 —.08 12 —.03
*denotes significance at a 5% level—44—
(3') x =A-(pt)'rpt
We will try several alternative cases regarding the assumed permanence
of a change in the variance. Using equations (2) and (3') we can calcu-
late first the effect on the spot rate of a once and for all change in
the variance of exchange returns holding the interest differential
* 47 i —iconstant:
tt
ds rp
(22) ___-- = +1J__÷' t
) d * e x (1—x) 2
t t t
Thisanalysis can be justified by assuming that the composition of
monetary and nonmonetary assets is varied in whatever way is necessary
to hold the interest differential constant. Since the change in is
permanent we know that the effect on tomorrow's spot rate will be the




is held fixed in this experiment. The analysis
is in the same spirit as our earlier attempts to quantify loosely the
effects of changes in the disturbance terni u in (2) and in expec-
tations when macroeconomic fundamentals are held constant.
The sign of the effect, equation (22), of the return variance on
the spot rate depends on the sign of the initial risk premium. If the
foreign asset initially pays a positive risk premium over the domestic
asset (because the supply that must be held exceeds the demand consti-
tuted by the minimum—variance portfolio A; rpt as we have defined it
is negative), then the permanent increase in uncertainty reduces the
demand for foreign assets and thus reduces their price The effect—45--
on st is zero if the initial risk premium is zero. &it the effect can
be very large in magnitude if the initial risk premium is non—zero, for
example if the initial risk premium is on the order of .03 (as it might
be if the entire 3 percent discount at which the dollar sold against the
mark or yen in the early l980s is attributed to a risk premium rather
than to expected depreciation). For our benchmark parameter values
(xt =1/2 =.01on an annual basis, and p =2),we can
calculate the linearized effect on the spot rate s of a change incL
Consider a permanent increase in the annual variance cfrom .01
to .02. (One standard deviation of the monthly standard deviation for
the $/DM exchange return is estimated at roughly 9.3% per year over the
December 1977 to April 1986 period in the bottom panel of Table 3; the
square is .0087.) Such a shock will have a possible linearized effect
OflSt ofroughly (—4)[ .02__joi =—600% ,alarge number. Of
2( .01)
course, permanent changes in 2t cannot occur very often.
The autocorrelations in Table 3 are also consistent with the
hypothesis that is white noise around its mean. Under such a
hypothesis no shocks are permanent. A purely transitory disturbance to
will have an effect which is very much smaller than that calculated
above: calculations based on (22) are mitigated by the presence of a
second term that arises because the spot rate is expected to go back to
its previous level.48
The results of this subsection suggest that additional research
be directed at the spot rate—conditional volatility nexus. In appendix
1 we consider the model (21) for as well as an ARCH process, in—46—
which the initial shock to the variance dies outgradually over time.
The algebra is considerably more complicated then for thetransitory
disturbance, because there is a third effect, via the rationalexpecta-
tion of an effect on the spot rate next period, when the innovationto
the variance will have only partially died out. The effecton the
exchange rate lies between the effects of a permanent and transitory
change in (Poterba and Summers (1986) calculate the effect of
variability in the variance of stock market prices on the level of stock
market prices •)49
IV.Survey Itaand Heterogeneous pectat1ons
Of the factors suggested as determining "excessivevariability"
in section I of this paper, we have considered the role of fundamentals
versus the disturbance term, and we have considered risk and the degree
of substitutability. We have still to consider the role ofexpectations
per se. The idea of destabilizing speculation——that investors, respon-
ding to non—zero expectations of exchange rate changes, work to raise
the variability of the exchange rate——is what is often meantby descrip-
tions of the market as excessively variable. The variance—bounds tests
and bubbles tests at first sounded like a promisingway to shed light on
questions of destabilizing speculation and bandwagons. If we were con-
fident about having specified the fundamentals correctly inequation (2),
then we might look to the variance—bounds and bubbles tests tosee if
the expectations term ASe is formed in a destabilizingway. More—47—
simply, we could compare the variance when ASe in equation (9) is
constrained to zero with the unconstrained variance: this is the test
for "destabilizing speculation" performed by Kohlhagen (1979) and
Eichengreen (1981). &it, as we argued in section II, we are not at all
confident about having specified the fundamentals correctly, which means
that there is no new information to be gained from these tests.
At the end of Part I we suggested that the best way to get at the
question of whether speculation is destabilizing or not is to consider
whether expected future depreciation responds positively or negatively
to a current change in the exchange rate. If a current depreciation,
originating in fundamentals or in anything else, generates anticipations
of further depreciation, speculators will sell the currency and thereby
exaggerate the depreciation. If it generates anticipations of future
appreciation, back in the direction of some long—run equilibrium,
speculators will buy the currency and thereby dampen the depreciation.
In this part of the paper we consider this question of how expectations
are formed.
A way of defining stabilizing expectations is that the expected
future spot rate gives a weight less than one to the contem-
poraneous spot rate, s, that it Is a convex combination of the
contemporaneous rate and other factors. We have the case of regressive
expectations when the "other factor" is the equilibrium rate :
=(l—8)s+ o(s) .
Or,in terms of expected depreciation,
(23) As+i = s)—48—
Stabilizing expectations are the case 0 < 0 < 1, destabilizing
expectations the case 0 < 0, and the borderline case is static
expectations, 0 =0.
1. Measuring Stabilizing and Istabilizing pectations
1.zo alternative ways of measuring expected exchange rate changes
are common in the literature. The first is the forward discount. The
second is ex post changes in the sample period, allowing only for a
purely random error term. The first is valid only if there is no time—
varying risk premium, and the second only under the rational expecta-
tions assumption (including the absence of regime changes, peso
problems, etc.).
When we use the rational expectations approach of substituting
t+1 for ts1 in the above equation (23) and interpreting the
regression error as a random expectational error, a test of 0 =0is a
test of a random walk in the true spot process, as in section II. Table
4a, which is drawn from Frankel and Froot (1985), looks for a tendency
of the dollar to regress toward equilibrium, where equilibrium is
alternatively measured in rows 1—4 by a constant and in rows 5—8 by the
value that would give purchasing power parity (with 1973—1980 as
the base period) .Weare unable to reject a random walk in several
(limited) post—1976 sample periods. We argued in section tI.1 that the
theoretical case for a reversion to equilibrium rather than a random
walk is much stronger in the case of the real exchange rate than it is
for the nominal exchange rate. Rows 9—12 of Table 4a report tests of
the tendency to regress toward where the change in the exchange
t—49—
rate is adjusted for expected inflation rates.5° If we wanted to apply
the same rational expectations assumption to the price levels as to the
nominal exchange rate, we would be back in section 11.1's tests of
changes in the real exchange rate. The results on our limi.ted post—1976
sample periods are the same as in most tests of ex ante purchasing power
parity on the floating rate period: we can find no statistically
significant tendency to regress toward an equilibrium.
These findings are exactly what we would expect from our earlier
conclusion that the speed of return to PPP may in fact be in the range
of 15—25 percent a year, but that the floating rate period does not
offer enough data to reject zero statistically. If we are sufficiently
confident about both the gradual tendency to return to equilibrium in
the longer run——based, for example, on the 115 years of U.S.—U.K. data——
and the rational expectations assumption, we can infer that speculators
must have stabilizing expectations. &t it would be better to have more
tangible evidence, since the 115 year autoregressions cover a number of
different economic policy regimes.
Table 4b uses the forward discount to measure expected depreci-
ation in the same regression equations. Such regressions will only be
valid in the unlikely case that the risk premium is uncorrelated with
the rlghthand—side variable (the current spot rate relative to its
equilibrium). Not surprisingly, the results are poor. Even when the
correction for expected inflation is applied, which makes the equation
essentially a regression of the short—term real interest differential
against the real exchange rate, the coefficient is statistically











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Independent variable: s(t) —s(t)
s measured by PPP
SUR Regressions(1) of Survey Expected Depreciation:
E(s(t+1)) —s(t)=a+ Os(t) —s(t))
Coefficient
Data Set Dates t:0 =0 DW(2) DF R2
MMS 1 Week 10/84—2/86 —0.0283 —3.53 ** 2.10 219 0.58
(0 .0080)
MMS2 Week 1/83—10/84 —0.0299 —3.78 ** 2.15 179 0.61
(0 .0079)
MMS1Month 10/84—2/86 —0.0782 —5.84 ** 1.40 151 0.79
(0 .0 134)
MMS3Month 1/83—10/84 —0.0207 —1.41 1.55 179 0.18
(0 .0146)
Economist 3 Month6/81—12/85 0.0223 1.78 * 1.66 184 0.26
(0 .0126)
Amex 6 Month 1/76—8/85 0.0315 1.56 1.22 45 0.21
(0.0202)
Economist 6 Month6/81—12/85 0.0600 3q77 ** 1.32 184 0.61
(0.0159)
Amex 12 Month 1/76—8/85 0.1236 4.48 ** 0.60 45 0.69
(0.0276)
Economist 12 Month 6/8 1—12/85 0.1750 8 .10 ** 1.25 184 0 .88
(0.0216)
(1) Amex 6 and 12 Month regressions use OLS due to the small number of degrees
of freedom
(2)The DW statistic is the average of the equation by equation OLS Durbin—
Watson statistics for each data set.
*representssignificance at the 10 percent level.
**representssignificance at the 1 percent level.
R2 corresponds to an F test on all nonintercept parameters.
The above results are reported In Frankel and Froot (1985)
Constant terms for each currency were included in the regressions, but not
reported above.—50—
Hooper (1985), Hutchison and Throop (1985), Golub et al (1985), Sachs
(1985) and Feldstein (1986) report regressions with the two variables
reversed, and find that the long—term real interest differential, in
particular, Is a significant factor explaining the real exchange rate.
&it when Meese and Rogoff (1986) examine real versions of the sticky
price monetary model of section 11.2, they find that real interest
differentials cannot explain movements in real exchange rates signi-
ficantly better than a random walk model. (The advantage of testing the
sticky price monetary model In real terms is that one abstracts from
instability in money demand parameters. Given the assumptions employed
in their paper, monetary shocks have proportionate effects on the real
exchange rate and real interest differential, and hence net out of the
analysis.) In any case, the entire approach of using the interest
differential or forward discount to measure expected depreciation will
be viewed as suspect by those concerned by the risk premium.
What is sorely needed is an alternative to measuring expected
depreciation either by ex post exchange rate changes or by the forward
discount, one that does not require pre—judging either the unbiasedness
of expectations or the existence of the risk premium. A good candidate
for such a measure is offered by surveys of the exchange rate expecta-
tions of market participants. One such survey has been conducted every
six weeks since 1981 by the Fconomist—affiliated Financial Report. The
data are discussed and analyzed at length in Frankel and Froot (1985,87)
and Froot and Frankel (1986).
Table 4c reports regressions of regressive expectations with
expected depreciation measured by the Economist survey data, for the—51--
samesamples of observations that were used in the preceding regressions
of ex post changes and forward discounts.5' Almost all the results show
a highly significant expectation of regression toward equilibrium, at a
rate of about 10 percent in the case of expectations at a six—month
horizon, which is (1 —•92)=20percent per year. (The expected speed
of adjustment per year is somewhat lower in the case of the three—month
horizon.) This expected speed of adjustment to PPP is in the range of
the actual speeds of adjustment estimated in Table 1, suggesting that
the low power in the regressions of ex post changes in Table 4a might
alone have been responsible for the failure to reject a random walk.52
Other tests reported in Frankel and Froot (1987), Dominguez
(1986), and Froot and Frankel (1986), show that the prediction error
made by the survey numbers is not in fact random. The tests constitute
a rejection of rational expectations (jointly with the hypothesis of no
regime changes or other peso problem) that is free from any concerns
about the risk premium. Generally, the true spot process behaves more
like a random walk than the survey respondents realize. In terms of the
language attributed to Rhlson (1981) in section 11.3 above, there is
excessive speculation: investors would do better to reduce their
expectations of exchange rate changes toward zero. In terms of the
specific regressive expectations model estimated in Table 4c, survey
respondents overestimate the speed of return to equilibrium.
One might think that such a failure of market efficiency would be
evidence of the sort we are looking for, that "exchange markets are not
working properly." it a tendency for speculators to expect the
exchange rate to regress toward the equilibrium at a faster rate than is—52—
correct is stabilizing. An increase in the value of the currency, due
in the context of equation (2) to an increase in the interest differ-
ential i_i* or the error term u for example, will be damped because
of the effect on expectations. We saw in equation (10) that the varia-
bility of the exchange rate in the DQrnbusch overshooting model is
inversely related to the value ofe.Ahigh 0 means that, for any
given positive interest differential, it takes less of an appreciation
to generate the necessary expectations of future depreciation.53
One cannot work with the survey data on expectations without
pondering the issue of heterogeneous expectations. Almost all of the
exchange rate literature, theoretical as well as empirical, presupposes
that market participants all share the same expectation. &it the truth
is that people disagree. Disagreement can explain the very high volume
of trading in the spot and forward exchange markets. The Economist's
Financial Report shows quite a range of variation in their survey
responses; the high—low spread for the six—month expectations averages
15.2 percent. (The regressions reported in the tables here are based on
the median response.)
The possibility of heterogeneous expectations introduces another
possible source of variability into the exchange rate: the market in
the aggregate may shift over time the weights it assigns to different
forecasting mechanisms, for example the weight assigned to regressive
versus bandwagon expectations in equation (5). The market may increase
the weight it gives to one of these formulations if it has recently been
forecasting better than the other. This could happen if portfolio mana-
gers update in a Bayesian way the weights they place on the forecasts of—53—
different models. Alternatively, it could happen when those investors
who bet correctly gain wealth and receive more weight in the market in
the next period. As the weight placed by the market on different expec-
tations shifts, the aggregate demand for foreign currency and therefore
the exchange rate will change over time. Even if no single forecaster
holds destabilizing bandwagon expectations, any factor pushing up the
value of the currency, such as an increase in (i_i*) or Ut will
produce a drawn—out appreciation as the weight placed on the optimistic
forecasts gradually increases. Although none of the actors in such a
model is satisfying the rational expectations assumption in the sense of
knowing the complete process that is driving the exchange rate, neither
is any of the actors behaving foolishly. Putting more weight on band-
wagon expectations than on regressive expectations would have given the
right answer in the case of the dollar from 1981 to February 1985, for
example, but would have lost the investor a lot of money thereafter. In
such a changing world it is difficult to see what variables it would be
"rational" for the investors to grant more weight.
We can offer some evidence for the idea that forecasters don't
concur on a single stabilizing sort of expectations model as nicely as
the estimates of regressive expectations in Table 4c would suggest.
Money Market Services, Inc., has conducted since 1983 a weekly survey of
currency traders as to their forecasts at shorter—term horizons than the
Economist survey. Estimates of regressive expectations on these two
sets of survey data, together with a third conducted by the American
Express Bank Review irregularly between 1976 and 1985, are reported fri
Table 4d. The nine data sets are ordered by forecast horizon. The—54—
results are striking. The longer—term forecasts are strongly regressive:
the &onotnist 12—month forecasts show that a 10 percent appreciation
today generates the expectation of a 1 .75 percent depreciation over the
subsequent year. The shorter—term forecasts show precisely the reverse
however: a 10 percent appreciation today generates the expectation of
0.78 percent further appreciation over the next month. This suggests
the possibility that the forecasters who subscribe to bandwagon expecta-
tions ("chartists," or technical analysts, who use time series analysis
to extrapolate past trends) tend to be traders with a shorter—term out-
look, while those who subscribe to regressive expectations ("fundatnen—
talists," who forecast a return to macroeconomic equilibrium) tend to be
economists with a longer—term outlook. A small change in the weight
that the market gives to two such different forecasts could have a big
effect on the exchange rate, especially if asset demands are as sensi-
tive to expected rates of return as was suggested by some of the substi-
tutability arguments in section iii.
2• Onclusion
The question, "are exchange rates excessively variable?", cannot
be answered by comparing the variance of the actual exchange rate to the
variance of a set of macroeconomic fundamentals. Overshooting theories,
which are based on fundamentals and are consistent with market eff 1—
ciency, allow exchange rate variability to exceed monetary variability
by an indefinitely high multiple.
More damaging is the finding of regression tests that measurable
fundamentals do not explain the exchange rate well, even contempo——55—
raneousLy. The proposition that the exchange rate follows a random
walk, in the sense that first differences cannot be explained by any-
thing, may be unnecessarily nihilistic. There does appear to be some
tendency for the exchange rate to return to equilibrium at longer
horizons •Eventhe dollar came home to earth in 1985—86. &it the error
term is very large in the shorter—term (e.g. monthly) data that is
available for most econometric studies.
It is tempting to argue that there must exist fundamentals of
which market investors are aware but the econometrician is not •Suchan
argument might be supported by any evidence that the market could pre-
dict future exchange rates better than the models; but there is no such
evidence. Expectations measured by the forward exchange market (or by
survey data) contain no useful information for predicting exchange rate
changes. The very bad performance of the forward discount, either as a
predictor of future changes in the forward exchange rate or as a contem-
poraneous determinant of the level of the exchange rate in equations
such as (8), could in theory be attributed to an exchange risk premium.
The framework of optimal portfolio diversification and conventional
estimates of the degree of risk—aversion seem to imply that the risk
premium does not vary enough to acquit the forward exchange market •A
welcome recent line of research takes the source of variation to be
changes in the conditional variance rather than changes in asset sup-
plies. &t this literature has yet to demonstrate that such variation
in the conditional variance can explain the bias in the forward rate.
We have seen that small changes in the variance, unless transi-
tory, could produce large changes in the demand for assets and therefore—56—
in the exchange rate as opposed to the risk premium.. &itunless
"changes in the variation in the exchange rate" is considered an
enlightening explanation of variation in the exchange rate, we are still
mostly in the dark.
Oneneednot explain all the fluctuations in the exchange rate to
evaluate the scope for government policy.55 Policy—makers could affect
the foreign exchange market through three different channels. First,
macroeconomic policy, for example interest rates and the mixbetween
monetary and fiscal policy, has large effects (the poor regression
reults not withstanding) .Wehave not explored the resulting policy-
making tradeoff between the exchange rate and other macroeconomic
objectives in this paper. They are thoroughly discussed elsewhere, and
the regression tests in any case suggest that the major determinants of
the exchange rate, at least on a shorter—term basis, lie elsewhere.
Second, Tobin (1978) and Dornbusch (1986) have argued that a tax
on International borrowing or on other foreign exchange transactions
would reduce the extent to which investors could react to small changes
in the attractiveness of different countries' assets, and would thereby
reduce exchange rate volatility. As we noted in section 1.2, this
argument requires that expectations be destabilizing. If expectations
are instead stabilizing, then a decrease in the degree of substituta-
bility would increase exchange rate volatility rather than the
reverse. On the other hand a Ibbin tax on foreign exchange transactions
should work to discourage short—term trading more than long—term
trading, since the given tax is a higher percentage of the return for
shorter term transactions. If our survey data findings are correct and—57—
short—term expectations (less than 3 months) are destabilizing but long—
term expectations (greater than 3 months) stabilizing, then a Ibbin tax
might reduce volatility after all.
Third, others argue that central banks should intervene in
foreign exchange markets to dampen fluctuations. Foreign exchange
intervention of course is generally thought to affect the exchange rate
to the extent it changes the relevant macroeconomic fundamentals,
particularly nonsterilized intervention that allows the change in
reserves to change the money supply. &t effects via current macro-
economic fundamentals should be subsumed in the first category above.
If foreign exchange intervention is to have an independent effect,
particularly if sterilized intervention is to have a substantial effect,
it will be via investor expectations of future exchange rate changes.
The strongest case for steps toward reform of the floating rate system
would be if one could demonstrate that expectations are destabilizing,
producing bandwagons in the exchange rate, and that a change in
government policy might alter these expectations even without altering
asset supplies, for example, by bursting a speculative bubble. The
announcement on September 22, 1985, that the G—5 had decided at the
Plaza Hotel to work to bring the dollar down caused an instant 5 percent
depreciation of the dollar. While the fall in demand for dollars could
be explained as a rational re—evaluation of the future expansionariness
of U.S. monetary policy, it might also be explained as the bursting of a
bubble. .ir theories of rational speculative bubbles have virtually
nothing to say about what causes the price to jump from one bubble path
to another •Witthis is precisely the sort of effect for which many—58—
proponents of a more activist policy are looking. Proponents of a
target zone argue that the stabilizing effect would be even greater if
the government announced a change in policy regime, rather than a one-
time initiative of the sort that took place at the Plaza.
The key question, then, seems to be the behavior of investor
expectations. In particular, much hinges on whether expectations when
left to themselves are destabilizing. The question whether the true
spot process matches up with the expected one, i.e., whether expecta-
tions are rational, Is not as directly relevant. The evidence appears
to be that expectations are stabilizing, at least at horizons greater
than three months. The survey data at a six month horizon reported in
Table 4c, for example, show that a 10 percent appreciation today
generates an expected future depreciation of about 1 percent, or 2
percent at a per annum rate. If speculators are investing on the basis
of these expectations, then they are acting to stabilize the exchange
rate. A Tobin tax to discourage speculation might then raise
variability.
Survey data at short horizons show quite different results
however •Itseems likely that expectations are in fact heterogeneous.
Oneconsequenceis that "the" expectation can't be rational if investors
do not agree on asingleexpectation. A second implication follows from
the high degree of substitutability (for an average value of the
variance) that we found in section III: small changes in the weights
that the market assigns to competing exchange rate forecasts will
produce large changes in portfolio preferences and thus large changes in
the exchange rate. This source of exchange rate variability could be—59—
classed as a speculative bubble in the sense that it arises from self—
confirming changes in expectations rather than from fundamentals, though
it is not the rational speculative bubble that has been extensively
studied recently.
As Krugman (1985) has argued, .when the market has temporarily
"lost its moorings,' It is possible that a more activist policy can
restore the anchor to expectations. Investors might be persuaded to
expect more of a tendency to return to equilibrium. Wit central bank
governors and finance ministers of major countries will only be able to
affect expectations If they have credibility. They did not have
credibility in 1973. In this sense the breakdown of the fixed exchange
rate system was inevitable. They have more credibility today; this much
is clear from the market's sensitivity to every utterance of the
Treasury Secretary and the thairman of the Federal Reserve, and their
Japanese and German counterparts. Whether this credibility would still
be there if policy—makers tried to exploit it more systematically with a
reform of the world monetary system is another question, especially if
one allows for the usual politicization of any process of choosing
targets for an economic price that affects people's livelihoods.—60—
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Combining these results we obtain
dst rp = {i+ (l-a) + (1a)4 +
rp _____ = + -1)]
Using our benchmark values for x, rp, and = (1.005)i
If we can also assume that a =.9as in equation (21) for ,then
ds 63.3. Therefore, the linearized effect on the spot rate of a .01
change in is an aproximately 63% appreciation of the less risky
t
currency.—61—
For the case where follows an AR(1) process,
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2See, for example, Williamson (1985)
3Ainong manypossiblecitations are Isard (1977), Krugman (1978),
Frenkel (1981), &igel and Frankel (1984), and Hardouvelis (1987)
Variation in the real exchange rate is documented in section 11.1.
41n Section 111.1 below, we will see that this linear form is the
correct one for an asset demand function under the assumption of mean—
variance optimization by investors.
5For example, Meese and Rogoff (1983a,b)
the framework of equations
insert a role for the (cumulated) current
demand of residents of country i to be
aggregating: (3') x =wjAi
—B(rp)
world wealth held by residents of country
cumulated claims on foreigners.
(2) and (4), we can easily
account by defining the asset
x =A1
—B(rp),and
where Wjisthe share of
i, which includes their
7See, for example, Dooley and Shafer (1983)
8Frankel and Froot (1986) show the equivalence. Note that in the
monetary model, dL/d(rp) =
9Forexample, Meese and Rogoff (l983a,b).
'OThe probability of collapse mayriseas s gets farther from
equilibrium. If not, the ratio g/(1—e) would have to be greater than—63—
one, unless the expected rate of depreciation (equal to the interest
differential under uncovered interest parity) is to be declining over
time as the bubble proceeds.
11For example, (buncil of Economic Advisers (1984)
'2&iison Miller and Williamson (1986) is an attempt to show how
a target zone would actually work in a macroeconomic model and McKibbin
and Sachs (1986) does the same for a variety of regimes. Also beyond
the scope of this paper is the question whether it is even a feasible
option for government intervention in foreign exchange markets to
stabilize the exchange rate without changing monetary and fiscal policy,
as are related questions of international policy coordination. However
the magnitude of our substitutability parameter is relevant to the
question of the effectiveness of sterilized intervention, as elaborated
in Frankel (1986a)
'3Poole (1967), Giddy and Dufey (1975), Mussa (1979) and ese
and Rogoff (1983a,b), among others.
'4We consider time—varying variances more in section 111.2.
'5The following discussion draws on Frankel (l986b)
16Roll (1979), Adler and Lehman (1983), Pippenger (1986)
17cumby and Obstfeld (1984, p. 146) used a Q—statistic to test
for higher order serial correlation in monthly real exchange rate
changes and found none. However, they also found that expected—64—
inflation differentials are unrelated to expected exchange rate changes,
rejecting the random walk characterization of the real exchange rate.
Huizinga (1986) is also able to reject the random walk.
'8llakkio's unrestricted process allows for a unit root.
Similarly the last line in Table 1 allows for the possibility of a
trend. Fromamacroeconomic viewpoint, rather than a statistical one,
one might consider the important question to be whether most changes in
the real exchange rate die out over time, rather than whether there are
sometimes also permanent changes in the real exchange rate, for example,
when the price of oil goes up.
19Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976) and Bilson (1978).
20ThiS is the case where B in equation (3) is infinite.
21This proportionality is tested directly in Part IV below.
22Dornbusch (1976), Frankel (1979)
23Branson (1977), Kouri (1976), Girton and Henderson (1977).
24Frankel (1984), Hooper and rton (1982)
25Overshooting can occur also in the portfolio—balance model,
where it can be viewed as the consequence of a finite rate of adjustment
in the stock of claims on foreigners, just as in the monetary model
overshooting can be viewed as the consequence of a finite rate of
adjustment in the general price level.—65—
26 1
In Dornbusch,-representsthe amount of overshooting. For
elaboration, see Frankel (1983, P. 42).
27Frankel (1979) .Thesample went up to February 1978.
28For example, Meese and Rogoff (1983a), Frankel (1984), and
ackus( 1984) .Sornanath(1986) reports updated fit statistics for the
above—mentioned models both insainpie (1975—1982) and out of sample
(1983) .Schinasiand Swamy (1986) use a method that allows coefficients
to change over time. The two more recent papers claim relatively good
results with a lagged endogenous variable.
29The rate—of—return term (j_i*) in equation (8), seems for
some reason to generate more econometrician anxiety over endogeneity
problems when it is expressed as expected depreciation, in
equation (9), even though it is the same variable when covered interest
parity holds.
30Meese and Rogoff (l983b) try a grid of parameter values. (kit—
of—sample performance, while better than a random walk at horizons
exceeding 18 months, is never good.
3100oley and Shafer (1983) and Hansen and Hodrick (1980) are two
of the tests that take the lagged prediction errors to be the available
information.
32Studies regressing against the forward discount Include Tryon
(1979), Levich (1980), Bilson (1981), Longworth (1981), Longworth,
Boothe and clinton (1983), Fama (1984) and Huang (1984) .Qimbyand—66—
Obstfeld (1984) and Obstfeld (1986) regressed against the Eurocurrency
interest differential and again found that for most exchange rates the
coefficient was significantly less than 1.0 and even less than zero.
(One would expect the same finding as in the forward discount tests,
given that the interest differential is equal to the forward discount by
covered interest parity.) These findings are also consistent with those
of Meese and Rogoff (1983a) that the random walk predicts, not only
better than other models, but better than the forward market as well.
33Equlvalently, in a regression of the prediction error
—fd
against fdt, the coefficient under the null hypothesis
should be zero.
34E.g. Frenkel (1978) and Frankel (1980)
35See Meese (1987) for a more rigorous argument.
exception is the unlikely case where, even though investors
are risk—averse, exchange rates are like the outcome of a bet on a foot-
ball game in that they are completely uncorrelated with other rates of
return (on all "outside" assets), so that exchange risk is completely
diversifiable.
37This statement assumes a Cobb—Douglas price index with weight
a on foreign goods. The constant term a in equation (11) can then be
interpreted as the (conditional) variance of the exchange rate times
(a —1/2),which is a quite small number.
38Frankel (1980), Krasker (1980), or Rogoff (1979)—67—
39Recall that the tests of forward rate unbiasedness in the
preceding section are also joint tests of rational expectations and no
risk premium.
401f u is known to be correlated with the monetary fundamentals
but an appropriate instrumental variable is available, then equation
(13) can still be estimated by the appropriate techniques, the same as
the standard regression equation (8). Casella (1985), for example,
allows for endogeneity of the money supply in her bubbles test of the
German hyperinflation.
41one could presumably relax the assumption of no risk premium by
specifying a portfolio—balance model, in place of (8), with bond sup-
plies appearing on the righthand—side. Assumption (b) would then be the
less—stringent condition that expected depreciation is an unbiased
predictor in the sample (requiring rational expectations and no peso
problem or regime changes). Woo (1984) has attempted this sort of
bubbles test.
42Fama (1984), Hodrick and Srivastava (1986) and Sweeney (1986)
provide evidence of b < 0 on different data sets •Notethat






se),(s+j —se)].The sum of the last two
terms is less than zero whenever b < 0.
435ee Frankel (1982), Rogoff (1984), Dooley and Isard (1982)
among others.—68--
441f investors are assumed to calculate their portfolios once a
year, the numbers are slightly different. The annual variance in
returns is observed to be about .01 •Thenan increase in the supply of
foreign assets equal to 1 percent of the portfolio of 2.0 basis points.
45Frankel (1982, P. 260) describes this assumption as one made
for convenience, to focus on variation in asset supplies and the risk
premium, with variation in the variances and covariances considered a
priority for future research.
46This model marginally outperforms (i) an autoregressive model
with lag length estimated, (ii) the sample mean or median, and (iii) a
random walk model, on the basis of out—of—sample fit.
47For simplicity we are leaving out the effect of a change in the
return variance on the minimum variance portfolio A via the convexity
term.
48Suppose =+ where is now a purely transitory
disturbance to The effect of on the exchange rate will be
considerably smaller than that implied by (22). Besides the direct
effect on from (22) we must recognize that the spot rate in the
subsequent period will return to its previous level, so that the risk
premium will rise by the full amount of the increase in s• Taking
account of this second offsetting term we get:
ds rp ds
t 1 1. t 1t
= +) [—i - -) --1 tt t tt
d ctt—69—
Note that the effect on expectations is much more important than the
portfolio valuation effect, due to the high degree of substitutability.
Again, if the initial risk premium is close to zero, the effect on a
change in the return variance is close to zero. &it if the initial risk
premium is .03 and we consider a transitory change in from .01 to
.02, the change in the spot rate will be roughly —(.03/.01)( .01) =
—.03,or a 3 percent appreciation of the less risky currency.
49Note that the mean—variance model (3') used to derive (22) is
less applicable when varies over time.
50The expected inflation rates used here are three—year forecasts
by DRI.
51lndeed, the samples were dictated by the availability of the
survey data.
is noteworthy that the survey data regressions are valid
even if the survey responses measure true expectations with error, so
long as the measurement error is random. The standard error of the
regression (and statistically significant coefficient estimates) imply
that the magnitude of the measurement error is small, relative, for
example, to the magnitude of the expectatiorial errors introduced when ex
post exchange rate changes are used as the lefthand—side variable.
5311weask what happens when the true speed of regression to PPP
is held constant but investors have a higher expected speed of regres-
sion 0, it turns out that the effect is still to reduce variability.
The effect on the conditional variance is shown in Frankel (1983)—70—
54For further elaboration on how such a model can work, see
Frankel and Froot (1986)
55Dornbusch (1986) points out that someone who believes that
exchange markets are not efficient need not necessarily believe that the
government could do better, any more than someone who, like Ibbin
(1978), believes that the markets are efficient need necessarily believe
in laissez—faire.—71—
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